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ABSTRACT 
Benchmarking of information security policies has two challenges: lack of 
communication between organizations and no two organizations are identical. In this paper, 
we attempt to propose an artifact for a benchmarking method of information security policy 
(BMISP), which can resolve the above challenges. We employ design science methodology, 
activity theory and international standards to design the artifact as a proof of concept.  We 
illustrate the applicability of the artifact using our pilot data.  
INTRODUCTION 
Endeavors to find an adequate balance between information security policy (ISSP) 
and investments in security have been discussed in the literature. Examples include: marginal 
returns to security investments (Hausken 2006), the optimal amount to invest in protecting a 
given set of information (Gordon et al. 2002), and the relationship between information 
security investment, stock market and IT value (Chai et al. 2011; Otim et al. 2012). Based on 
these actions, practitioners and scholars have suggested a number of methods for efficient 
investments such as return on security investments (ROSI), risk assessment, cost benefit 
analysis (CBA), and market-value analysis. According to CSI report of 2011, 68% of 
companies use ROSI to justify security investments, 12% use net present value (NPV) and 15% 
use internal rate of return (IRR) (Berger 2011).  
However, these methods have fundamental challenges. Losses of information security 
are difficult to quantify since some are intangible (Hovav and D’Arcy 2003). Moreover, some 
incidents may cause zero damage while one incident can cause millions of dollars in damage 
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(Hovav 2014; Wang et al , 2008).  In addition, the objectives of some cyber-attacks are not 
for profits. Thus, the attacks are unclear and create a domino effect. The consequences from 
these types of attacks are difficult to calculate because it is complex to predict all possible 
vulnerabilities and due to lack of historical data (De Bruijn et al. 2010). On the other hand, a 
benchmark provides details on which controls should be considered following the 
recommended practices or industry standards. Benchmarking provides balanced investments 
calculation through the process of seeking out and studying practices used in other 
organizations (Whitman et al. 2013). Through benchmarking, the organization may employ 
collective intelligence based on previous experience in its industry. However, benchmarking 
has two major challenges. Firstly, organizations are reluctant to share data regarding 
information security that is sensitive to the operation, reputation and company’s value 
(Whitman et al. 2013). Another challenge with benchmarking is that no two organizations are 
identical. Even if two organizations offer products or services in the same market, their size, 
composition, management, organizational culture and technologies are not the same.  
In this paper, we attempt to propose an artifact for the benchmarking method of 
information security policy (BMISP), which can resolve the challenges discussed above. In 
order to overcome the first issue, we propose a universal artifact that indicates industry 
average of information security policy based on information security management system 
(ISMS) standards such as ISO 27001 and ISO 27004. The artifact consists of standardized 
information security measurements. Thus, organizations can communicate without disclosing 
details regarding their information security policy. Secondly, we employ design science 
methodology and activity theory in order to overcome the contextual challenge. The issue can 
be resolved if the artifact is capable of transferring knowledge from one circumstance in 
which it was produced to another situation (MacLean et al. 2002; Van Aken 2005). To do this, 
we employ activity theory as an overarching theory to develop the artifact. Activity theory 
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provides a theoretical framework to develop an artifact based on interaction activities 
between artifact, object, subject, instrument, community and rule. Following the guideline of 
activity theory, the knowledge that is acquired from various ISSP, government requirements 
and organizational traits can be standardized. In addition, we employed design science 
methodologies to validate the artifact.  
To summarize, we followed design science research guidelines proposed by Hevner et 
al., Peffers et al., and Vijay et al. (Hevner et al. 2004; Peffers et al. 2007; Vaishnavi et al. 
2008).  
(1) Develop a visualized artifact that standardizes information security policies for 
benchmarking.  
(2) Incorporate an activity theory approach that improves the management of information 
security policy and compliance. 
(3) Carry out an artifact evaluation using a three-step approach: 
a. Initiate a request for comment (RFC) process 
b. Employ an empirical testing to show the value of the artifact 
c. Develop a prototype system and demonstrate it to information security 
analysis in an organizational level 
In this paper, we illustrate the development of the BMISP. We include related 
literature, conceptual artifact, procedures to compose the measurements, and measurements 
validation process. In the remainder of this paper, we will first examine the existing literature 
on information security policy and activity theory. Next, we explore elements of BMISP such 
as measures, constructs and concept in international standards. We then present an example 
of an artifact based on the findings in literature and international standards. We conclude with 
the future study with further validation process of the BMISP and potential topics. 
BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The Principle of Information Security 
Information security refers to the adoption of measures to prevent the unauthorized 
use, misuse, modification, or denial of use of information, knowledge, facts, data or 
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capabilities (Code ; Talbot et al. 2011; Whitman et al. 2013). In this sense, the purpose of 
information security protection is to identify the information that requires protection (Alberts 
et al. 2002), classify information assets according to their sensitivity, apply security 
management principles (Whitman 2003), and comply with relevant policies, law and legal 
requirements (Talbot et al. 2011; Whitman et al. 2013). 
Talbot et al. (2011) and Whitman et al. (2013) proposed principles of information 
security. These principles are extended from CNSS (Committee on National Security System) 
model and McCumber (2004) cube to encompass the constantly changing information 
security environment. The Talbot et al. and Whitman et al. models used different terms to 
describe the same concepts with the exception of CIA (confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability), which is used in all models. We use terms from Whitman et al (2013) and 
compromise the definitions of terms with Talbot et al (Table 1).     
Table 1 Principles of information security 
Whitman et al. 
(2013) 
Talbot et al. (2011) McCumber 
(2004) 
Definition 
Confidentiality Confidentiality Confidentiality 
The information asset is maintained in a secure manner 
by employing adequate privileges and controlled access.  
Integrity Integrity Integrity 
The quality or state of information asset being whole, 





The information asset will be available without 





No one other than authorized custodians or recipients can 
access all information asset or parts. The information 
asset should be used and stored according to the 








The access to information asset should be under proof of 
data delivery (authentication), proper methods to confirm 
user’s identity (identification), and granting proper 
authority to access, update or delete of the information 
asset.  
Accountability - - 
The accountability exists when a method controls 
assurance that information asset related activities are 
codified and traceable.   
 
Activity Theory 
The development of an artifact requires systematic approaches (Hevner et al. 2004; 
Purao et al. 2008). The systematic process may require a process of elicitation, depicter, and 
analysis. This involves determining the internal elements, structures, and relationships of the 
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artifact (Pressman 2005; Zowghi et al. 2005). In this paper, we employ activity theory to 
guide the requirements gathering process (Engeström 2000; Engeström et al. 1999). Activity 
theory provides a lens to comprehend and analyze social phenomena finding a pattern, and 
theorizes across interactions between groups of organizations, individuals and computers. 
Activity theory argues that an individual produces an instrument when the individual 
interacts with the surrounding social environment. The instrument enhances social interaction 
by creating a transferring process that other people can access the instrument (Vygotsky 
1980). In activity theory, the activity is considered a structure consisting of various sub-
activities that are related to the core activities (Engeström et al. 1999). As explanations of the 
activity, the theory suggests six elements – object, subject, community, artifact, division of 
labor and rule.  
(1) Object refers to a certain goal of the activity systems; the object is what the activity is 
directed at and can be considered the ultimate reason behind various behaviors of 
individuals, groups, or organizations (Kaptelinin 2005).  
(2) Subject is the actor that is an active element of the activities. The actor can be either an 
individual or group (Kaptelinin et al. 1995).  
(3) Community refers to all other actors that are involved in the activities (Engestrom 
2000).  
(4) Instrument refers to the tool used by the actors in the system that acts as a mediator of 
accumulation and transmission of social knowledge (Kaptelinin et al. 1995).  
(5) Division of labor is the classification of activities among actors in the system 
(Kaptelinin 2005). 
(6) Rule refers to conventions, social norms and guidelines that regulate the activities in the 
system (Engestrom 2000; Kaptelinin et al. 1995). 
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In this research, we employ a third-generation activity theory. The theory argues the 
use of multiple interacting activity systems to investigate complex social activities 
(Engeström 2014). The theory allows has an aggregated view of activity interactions not only 
for a single activity system but also for multiple activity systems, which depict overall 
interactions of the activity systems for a shared object (Engeström 2001).  
Benchmarking of ISSP is a complex activity since the organization should consider 
various interactions between other organizations, standards, governmental regulations, and 
organizational structures. The principle component (e.g., subject) of benchmarking changes 
depending on the circumstances, and the implemented policies; the benchmarking process is 
influenced by social (e.g., community) and technical (e.g., instrumental)) factors whose 
relationships undergo environmental changes. By applying activity theory, we may 
investigate the interactions of benchmarking along the dimensions of subject, activity, 
instrument, community, rule, and division of labor in a systematic way. In our study, we 
capture all of these key-benchmarking elements in our artifact and standardize them to 
validate the relevancy of BMISP.  
BMISP development 
We sought to develop BMISP that standardizes the key principles of information 
security based on the guidance of international standards for ISMS. In this section, we apply 
the concepts introduced in the preceding section to facilitate the BMISP development process.  
To define the scope of BMISP, we firstly establish a visual artifact named information 
security hexagon (ISH) that indicates degrees of information security based on the principles 
of information security. In ISH, the degree of each principle represents average degree that is 
measured by the organization’s ISSP (Figure 1). Secondly, we visually extend the ISH with 
detail measurements (Figure 2).   
Meta-model Development  
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We determine a meta-model for BMISP informed by activity theory and international 
standards. Table 2 exemplifies the definitions, implications of activity theory for BMISP, and 
BMISP measurement for three constructs. The concept of activity theory provides structural 
relationships between ISH and objectives of ISSP. The international standards, ISO 27000 
series, provide a detail guidance to establish rigorous and reliable measurement constructs for 
BMISP. In figure 3, we demonstrate the meta-model of BMISP and example based on an 
illustration of activity theory. 
Figure 1 Illustration of ISH   Figure 2 ISH with detail measurements 
 
Employing the same approach and methodology of ISO 9000 series for quality 
assurance standards, ISO has assigned the 27000 numbering range for a series of information 
security standards for ISMS. The series consists of fifteen standards regarding vocabulary, 
requirements, controls, guidance, measurement, and risk management. In this research, we 
use components of ISMS control requirements and measurements that are depicted in ISO 
27001 and ISO 27004. ISO 27001 depicts requirements for establishing, implementing, 
maintaining and continuity of ISMS. ISO 27004 provides guidance for development and use 
of measures for ISMS. In addition, we employ ISO 15939, which guides the quantitative 
research methodology for our measurements in BMISP.  
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Figure 3 Examples of BMISP and activity theory 
 
 
BMISP Component Development 
As the last step in the development of the BMISP, we propose components of BMISP 
based on aforementioned methodologies. We use the ISO 27001 naming convention for the 
BMISP components. However, we redefine the meaning of each component according to the 
purpose of this research. The components of the BMISP consist of three aspects: 
measurement and indicator specifications, recommended decision and interpretation, and 
stakeholders and responsibilities.  
Table 2 Meta-model description of BMISP informed by activity theory 








Desired object of information security policy to mitigate and prevent incidents of 
information security. 
BMISP implication The object provides general purpose of BMISP and its measurement constructs. 
ISO derived BMISP 
measurement 
construct 
 Measurement construct identification [ISO 27004] 
o Measurement construct name 
o Purpose of measurement construct  
o Objective of control and process [ISO 27001] 
 Object of measurement and attribute [ISO 27004] 










Incidents and issues that are related with information security. For instance, endpoints 
issues, security breaches, hacking, information leakage. 
BMISP implication The subject that BMISP is applied. 
ISO derived BMISP 
measurement 
construct 
 Measurement construct identification [ISO 27004] 












Relevant stakeholders who are related with information security concerns such as third-
party, IS/IT developer community, partners, customers, government, and agencies.  
BMISP implication 
BMISP should consider interactive incidents of information security between the 
stakeholders.  
ISO derived BMISP 
measurement 
construct 
 Stakeholders [ISO 27004] 
o Client for measurement  
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Measurement and indicator specifications: The required measurements for determining the 
degree of ISH are defined below:   
Measurement construction identification identifies the purpose of measurement 
construct, objective of control, and list of controls. The component explains the reasons of the 
measurement and specific objectives to achieve through the measurement. Based on the 
objectives, the component contains respective control and process under the measurement.  
Object of measurement and attribute identify the entity that is characterized through 
the measurement and attribute. The attributes are property or characteristic of the object that 
can be quantified to measure. For instance, object of measurements can be information 
security policies, configurations of ISMS software, and organizational resources for 
information security.  
Base and derived measure specification define measures in terms of an attribute and 
the method for quantifying it. Derived measure is defined as a function of two or more values 
of base measure. 
Indicator specification provides the state or level of ISSP. Indicator specification also 
includes methods for visual presentation and algorithms to combine the measures.  
Recommended decision and interpretation: Methodologies of decision criteria and 
interpretation of measurements are determined using the following components.   
Decision criteria specification includes threshold, targets, or patterns that are used for 
determining the need for action, re-engineering, and further investigation.  
Measurement result provides a general guidance based on the description of how the 
indicator and measurement should be interpreted. Reporting formats are included in this 
component. The measurement results may provide guidance to determine whether to increase 
or ease the restrictions of information security policy. 
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Stakeholders and responsibilities:   Methodologies of communication and responsibilities 
of actors are determined using the following components. The actors can be internal or 
external to an organization. The relevant rule, policy, and government regulations are also 
specified.  
Stakeholders specify internal management or other interested parties who are relevant 
to the ISSP. Reviewers, owners of information, data collectors and communicators are 
examples of the stakeholders.  
Frequency and period determine periods of data collection and periodic revision rules 
of the organization for examining BMISP. The frequency and revision rules may differ by 
ISMS specifications and organization’s interests.  
CASE STUDY: BMISP FOR SYSSP OF EDRM 
The following case study illustrates the above methodology.  The case study includes 
detail components, explanations and examples of BMISP. We choose a system-specific 
security policy (SysSP) as a type of ISSP. Specifically we employ an enterprise digital right 
management (EDRM) policy. EDRM refers to the use of digital rights management (DRM) 
technology in the enterprise. EDRM includes various access control technologies for secure 
usage of information assets such as software, documents, data, hardware or content. EDRM is 
frequently employed to manage information assets in persistently protected way throughout 
the information asset’s lifecycle (Morin et al. 2012). Enterprises have adopted EDRM to 
comply with relevant regulations and policies because EDRM enables the originator of the 
asset to establish rules of persistent controls and permissions (Jeon et al. 2015).  
Data Collection 
We use implemented SysSP data provided by an ISMS software integrator (Company 
X). We used SysSP from a total of seven programs: Secure Node (FSN), Secure Printer (FSP), 
ePrint (FEP), Secure Exchange (FSE), Mobile Gate (FMG), Secure Screen (FSS), and 
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Personal Identity Information Management (PIIM). FSN provides encryption and authority 
settings of all files and data that are saved on a PC. FSP and FEP trace and track printing 
activities. FSE controls and tracks data sharing processes with external users. FMG controls 
the usage of mobile devices for work. FSS protects sensitive information displayed on the 
computer screens. PIMM protects personal identifiable information using masking methods 
and encrypting technologies. We extract 69 tables and 223 attributes. Our prototype data set 
contains 978 data points.  
























BM1. Number of digital Information asset classifications 
BM2. Distance between classifications 




BM3. Expiration duration of Information asset encryption policy 
BM4. Expiration duration of print policy 
BM5. Expiration duration of information exchange policy 
BM6. Expiration duration of computer screen policy 




BM8. Number of automatic encryption file types 
BM9. Number of allowed macro programs 
 
BMISP Application 
To provide proof-of-concept of BMISP, we chose one section of the ISH, 
confidentiality (Table 4). To demonstrate application of BMISP, we focus on digital 
information asset classification. First, we extract a list of information asset classifications and 
types of authorized accounts for each classification. Subsequently, we draw staked charts that 
present different level of authorities by account types. The degree of digital information asset 
classification can be illustrated through the shape of charts. The convex shape of the charts 
shifts to the right side as the level of the classification decreases. The degree of BM1 and 
BM2 will increase as an organization has more number of classifications and less distance 
between the convex shapes. 
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Figure 1 Information asset classification and authority distribution 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The study introduces a new approach in the development of information security 
policy benchmarking, leveraging systemic approaches based on third-generation activity 
theory. Activity theory and international standards are used to identify BMISP components. 
The utilization of activity theory proposes the conformance of BMISP to business goals and 
objectives of information security. The ISO 27000 series provides a general guidance to 
determine the components of BMISP in a rigorous manner.  
Since this research paper is an analogy of methodology of BMISP, we did not include 
the actual testing portion and development of the prototype. These will be done based on the 
proposed BMISP structures by conducting RFC, implementation of the prototype, and an 
empirical case study. We will develop detailed data language based on markup language for 
visualization and communication of the BMISP. Subsequently, we will conduct an empirical 
testing using policy implementation logs from 300 companies.  
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